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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Chief, SR/CA
Room 5B29

add

EXTENSION

NO.

6408

DATE

23 Mar 65

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1

Chief, SR/RR

24 MAR 1965

[REDACTED]

S - pls log to B

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SR/CA -

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1-4. [REDACTED] - think the subject matter here is pretty isofur to be considered for positive intel dissemination interesting tho it may be [REDACTED]

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No interest on the part of EE/PBR/115 in [REDACTED]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

SECRET

23 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: SR/RR


SUBJECT : Rumanian Claims to BUKOVINA and
BESSARABIA

1. The following was told to AECASSOWARY/29 by the second Secretary of the Rumanian Permanent Mission to the UN, Grigore ALDESCU, during a luncheon at which A/29, ALDESCUE and an AECASSOWARY source were present. The AECASSOWARY source with whom ALDESCUE has met several times in the past was the host.

2. ALDESCU was interested in what the reaction of Ukrainian emigres in the West would be if Rumania were to demand separation of Bessarabia and Bukovina from the UkSSR for annexation to the Rumanian People's Republic. He said the problem was more or less theoretical at present, or rather in the realm of historical and cultural interests but, nevertheless, he wanted to know what Ukrainian reaction would be in the event certain cultural or scholarly Rumanian circles would raise the question "more intensively." The way in which ALDESCU explained the "innocence" of the demands of the cultural or scholarly circles left A/29 with the impression that Bucarest was contemplating some political action in regard to Bukovina and Bessarabia. A/29 told ALDESCU that Ukrainians naturally would be against separation of Bukovina from the UkSSR but that if Rumania succeeded in her demands it could mitigate the situation by granting Ukrainians full cultural autonomy. Rumania could woo Ukrainian sympathies by a positive cultural policy which would be contrasted with the Soviet Russification policy in the Ukraine. ALDESCU reminded A/29 that the present Rumanian cultural policy toward Ukrainians in Rumania was favorable. There are Ukrainian schools, a department of Ukrainianistics at Bucarest University and a Ukrainian-language newspaper published in 70,000 copies.

3. ALDESCU was asked whether the de-Russification which took place in recent years in Rumania could be identified with a de-Ukrainianization as well. He replied that these were two separate things and that, furthermore, the de-Russification was a natural consequence of the changed international atmosphere; i. e., full self-assertion of Rumanians and other Eastern European nations. He said a reversal of the present situation was impossible. Enhancement of the political and economic status of the satellites (with perhaps the exception of Bulgaria) and their contacts with the Western world was the best guarantee against such a reversal. The conflict between Moscow and Peking

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was another very important element indeed.


4. There were ^{no} conditions at the present time which ALDESCU could see for rebuilding the Soviet Union into a socialist commonwealth and extending the process of self-assertion of nations to the Ukraine and the other non-Russian republics. He felt Georgians were ^{very} nationally conscious element but this sense of nationality was less articulated and weaker among Ukrainians and other non-Russians. He was, of course, aware of Ukrainian ambitions and did not deny their significance but the problem was whether under the circumstances Ukrainians were capable of going as far as, for instance, the Rumanians. When it was suggested by A/29 that Rumanians could help their Ukrainian colleagues in this respect he wanted to know how. He did not comment when told that they could help through cultural exchanges and "good example."

5. ALDESCU said he had noticed ^agreat difference between Russians and Ukrainians on a trip from Kiev to Moscow but that this, of course, was not enough to make any political conclusions. He has little communication with Ukrainians at the UN but his Ukrainian colleagues at the UN showed no specific nationalist trends. They always try to convince others that they are very happy. On the other hand, if they did show different tendencies it would be "too dangerous to discuss them here."

6. As an example of the independence achieved by Rumania ALDESCU mentioned a treaty on the exploitation of Uranium ore in Rumania concluded between the USSR and Rumania in 1951 which had given the Soviet Union exclusive rights to the research and exploitation of uranium for ten years. Rumanians refused to renew the treaty in 1961 despite strong pressures by the Soviet Government. Now the Rumanians exploit uranium ore themselves and only for peaceful purposes.

7. According to ALDESCU, Rumania did not send delegates to the conference of representatives of the communist parties in Moscow because they knew nothing would come of the conference.

8. Should the foregoing be of interest for dissemination purposes, the source may be described as a Western citizen of



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Ukrainian birth from a Bulgarian diplomatic representative to a Western European country. The place acquired may be a Western Europe capital. Please address any inquiries you may have concerning this information to [] on extension 7168 in room 5B29.

[Chief, SR/CA]

